

OPENING STATEMENT

on behalf of Tōgō Shigenori

I NOW OPEN THE EVIDENCE on behalf of Tōgō Shigenori. We have chosen so far as possible to present it, for the Tribunal's greater convenience, under a few general divisions: Connection with German affairs, and with Russian; British and American relations and the Pacific War; war-time diplomacy; the ending of the war. The division will be very imperfect, since a witness often testifies to a diversity of matters. As to each of these heads, evidence will be offered to establish substantially the following state of facts.

Toward Japanese-German relations Mr Tōgō's attitude was always that they should not be such as to damage Japan's relations with other countries--specifically the U S S R, the United States and the British Empire. Unsympathetic to the Anti-Comintern Pact from its conception, and laboring to weaken and soften it; so obstinately opposed to a tripartite alliance that for his opposition he was transferred from his Ambassadorship in Berlin; he was the Cassandra of the Nazi decade.

With the Soviet Union he always maintained that cordial relations was of prime importance; and the accident of his career gave him opportunity to see carried out almost completely the policy which he early formulated and for which he unceasingly worked. He successfully managed the negotiations for the sale to Manchoukuo of the Soviet interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway; he attained, for the first time in the history of Soviet-Japanese relations, a beginning of border-demarcation; and his work as Ambassador in Moscow had all but resulted in the conclusion of a non-aggression pact when he was recalled. Throughout the Pacific War, when he was in office, he stressed the cardinal importance of maintaining the Soviet-Japanese peace and friendly relations.

With British and American affairs Mr Tōgō had little direct connection prior to becoming Foreign Minister in October 1941. When he had opportunity, he worked for improvement of those relations--he had for example persuaded the authorities to negotiate for an agreement with Britain concurrently with execution of the Anti-Comintern Pact; he had opposed the Japanese Navy's stand on naval disarmament as likely to impair good relations with America and Britain; and he became Foreign Minister with the hope of salvaging those wrecked relations. Concerning his connection with the Pacific War through his service in the Tōjō Cabinet--which may readily be conceived to be intended as the gravamen of the charge against Mr Tōgō here--it will appear that, being in no governmental position, he was called upon by the new Premier whom he knew but casually to accept the post of Foreign Minister. This post he accepted only after having obtained the unequivocal commitment that the new cabinet would work sincerely for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations, and that the Army would acquiesce. Thereafter he labored under conditions of extreme difficulty at a double task: on the one hand attempting to save the Japanese-American negotiations and relations, long since strained almost irretrievably; on the other, persuading the military High Commands, in the Liaison Conference where the matter was managed and where their voice was predominant, to permit him to make the attempt.

It proved an impossible task. The United States, unwilling to accept the concessions which it had been possible to make, served in the form of its note of 26 November what all Japanese concerned regarded as an ultimatum. The choice was between surrender of the national position as a power, perhaps endangering the national existence, and war in self-defence. That was the choice; and it was no choice. War was decided upon; Foreign Minister Tōgō, having opposed war to the last, was compelled to agree that arms must be taken up in self-defence.

When the question arose of the formalities for commencement of war, Mr Tōgō again had to overcome High Command opposition, to insist that the usual

procedure of notification be followed. He was authorized by the Liaison Conference to serve upon the United States Government a notification of termination of negotiations. The question of the time for serving it was settled by the High Commands, who assured the Foreign Minister that the time proposed would allow a sufficient interval before the initiation of hostilities. It was thus agreed, and orders went out for notification in Washington at 1 P.M. of 7 December; through mismanagement in Washington, however, the notice was in fact served more than an hour late, and well after the attacks on American and British territories were under way.

With war in progress, there was little for diplomacy to do; from that little, much was subtracted by creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry. As a result of differences of opinion on this and other basic policies, Foreign Minister Tōgō resigned from the cabinet on 1 September 1942, less than eleven months after entering it. Already before that he had been planning how to bring about an end to the war. The opportunity came when in April 1945 he was recalled from retirement by the Premier-Designate, Admiral Suzuki, and was again offered the foreign affairs portfolio--and again he imposed conditions, this time, that the cabinet should be the one to end the war. His efforts throughout the short life of the Suzuki cabinet were devoted to that end, which was achieved primarily through those efforts on 15 August 1945.

It is submitted that this proof will demonstrate that the role of Tōgō Shigenori, so far from being that of a conspirator for aggression, was throughout his career been that of opposition to militarism and to the consequences which he foresaw would result from it.

冒頭陳述

東郷茂徳の辯護を始めます。法廷の便宜の爲我々は出来得る限り證據を小數の項目に分けて提出します。即ち、獨逸關係、露西亞關係、英米關係及太平洋戦争、戦時外交、及終戦であります。

但し證人は往々各般の事項に亘つて証言するので右の分類は不完全であります。右各項に就て證據は主として次の諸事實を明らかにしやうとするものであります。

日獨關係に就ては東郷氏の態度は常に日獨關係が日本と他の諸國間に於て、英、露の諸國との關係を惡化せしむる如きものであつてはならぬと言ふことであります。防共協定に就ては當初より之に同意を有せず之を弱化することに努力しました。三國同盟には強く反感を續け、其結果終に駐獨大使の地位を追はれたのであります。東郷氏はナチス時代のカサン・ドラであつたのであります。

蘇聯邦に就ては東郷氏は終始友好關係維持を以て最も重要なりと爲しました。東郷氏は其の經歷を無じ其の夙に立案し其實現に努力した政策を殆ど完全に實現することか出来ました。

東郷氏は東支鐵道を蘇聯邦より滿洲國に賣渡す交渉に成功し、國境確定問題に就て初めて成功を收め、又駐露大使として不可信條約の締結に殆ど成功した時、帝朝を命ぜられたのであります。

太平洋戦争を通じ東郷氏は現職に在る時は常に日蘇間の平和と友好関係の重要性を強調しました。

英米兩國との關係に就ては東郷氏は一九四一年十月外務大臣に就任する迄殆んど直接の關係を持ちませんでした。但し機會ある毎に日本と英米との關係の改善に努力しました。東郷氏は防共協定と共に英米との協定に就て關係當局を説得し、海軍軍縮問題に就ては米英兩國との關係を阻害することなからしむる爲海軍側の主張に反発し、又外務大臣に就任しては破綻に瀕した外交の調整に努めたのであります。東郷氏が東郷内閣の外相として太平洋戦争に關係した點は幾いもなく檢察側の主たる訴追であるが、東郷氏は當時官職から退いて居た處殆ど同氏を知らない新首相から入閣を求められたのである。

此の入閣は新内閣は日米交渉の成功の爲に眞剣に努力すべく海軍も之に反発せずとの明確な保證を取付けた後初めて東郷氏は受諾したのである。爾後同氏は甚だ困難な事情の下に二つの事を爲したのである。即ち一は久しく悪化して破綻に瀕して居た日米交渉及び日米關係を恒決せんと努力したること、他の一は此の關係を扱つた連綿會議に於て統帥部の勢力が甚だ強かつたのであるが日米交渉及び日米關係の爲の勢力を爲し得る機統帥部を降格したことである。

然し乍ら東郷氏の使命は不可能なものであつた。米國は予し得へかりし譲歩を爲すを欲せず、日本側の總ての關係者が最後通牒と認めた十一月二十六日の覺書を手交した。日本としては其の大國としての地位を抛棄し其の存在すら危殆に瀕するに甘んずるか或は自衛の戦争に訴へるかの一を償はざるを得ざる立場に追込まれたのであるが、實際其の間接交渉の余地はなかつたのである。斯して戦争は決定された。東郷氏は最後迄戦争に反対したか終に自衛の爲武器を執ることに賛成せざるを得なかつたのである。

戦争開始の手續の問題の起つた時、東郷氏は通常の通告の手續を執ることを主張し、此の都合にも統帥部の反對と駁はなければならなかつた。東郷氏は連絡會議に於て米國政府に對し交渉打切りの通告を爲すことを認められた。通告手交の時間には統帥部に依り定められたが統帥部は東郷氏に對し其の時間は攻撃開始の時間との間に充分の余裕あることを保障した。

かくして十二月七日午後一時に手交のことに打合せられ、其旨命令されたのである。但し實際に手交されたのは薩摩嶺に於ける事務の手遣ひに依り一時間以上も遅れ、米英兩國の領土に攻撃が加へられてから後になつたのであつた。


戦争開始後は外交の余地は減少したが其の上不東盟省の設置に依り

其範圍は一層減少した。

此の問題並に他の根本政策の問題に就ての意見の不一致から東郷氏は一九四二年九月一日外務大臣の職を辞したが、既に其辭職の前から東郷氏は戦争修結の方策を進めて居た。一九四五年四月東郷氏は不命を拜した鈴木大將から再び外務大臣として入閣を求められた此の場合に東郷氏は入閣の條件を附したが、其の條件は鈴木内閣が戦争を修結せしめると云ふことであつた。

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
鈴木内閣の短い期間東郷氏は此の目的の爲に全力を盡し終に主として其の努力に依り一九四五年八月十五日此の目的は達成されたのである。證據は東郷茂徳氏の反制は侵略の爲の共同謀議者のそれではなく、終生宣明主義を其の眼見し得べき結果に反對したことであつたと云ふことを示すであらうことを茲に述べる次第である。



at present. Some of the more important ones have not been inserted due to lack of space in the crowded districts.

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Map of Shanghai



Note: Reproduced here is a map of Shanghai, with names of main points, which are prominently figuring in everyday news